为了评估央行数字货币(CBDC)零售交易的前景，各国央行已经开始了自己的工作计划。然而，CBDC的发行对于货币政策的实施、货币政策的传导和金融稳定具有重要意义，这取决于CBDC的具体设计特点，如薪酬、持有限额或对CBDC持有的资产进行选择和定价。欧洲央行的工作论文《央行数字货币设计的统一框架:薪酬、折扣率和数量限制》(Aunifiedframeworkforcbdcdesign:remureration，collairadestsan)在动态均衡模型中研究了中央银行数字货币(CBDC)的宏观经济影响。中央银行可以为中央银行设定贷款和抵押货币。中央银行数字货币的正利率或更严格的质押或数量限制将减少福利，但如果银行存款和中央银行数字货币之间的替代灵活性很小，它可能会控制金融脱媒。中国人民大学金融技术研究所（微信ID：ruc_fintech）编译了文章的核心部分。 过去几年，数字支付模式发展迅速。加密货币资产和大型科技公司对私人货币发行的思考引起了人们对私人货币相关安全和数据保护的关注。央行已经开始了自己的工作计划，以评估央行数字货币(CBDC)发行零售交易的前景。然而，根据CBDC的具体设计特点，CBDC的发行对实施货币政策、货币政策传导和金融稳定具有重要意义，如使用CBDC支付工资、持有CBDC限额或选择和定价CBDC持有的资产。 为了研究这些问题，本文构建了一个一般的平衡模型，包括搜索和匹配摩擦。该模型要求企业家借用内部货币(银行存款)和外部货币(CBDC)来支付生产中使用的两种不同类型的投资。央行选择向企业家发放贷款的利率和支付工人CBDC存款的利率。它还可以限制每笔贷款的规模，并为CBDC未来收入设计折扣率作为贷款抵押品。该模型假设通过生产函数反映了CBDC在平衡中的存在，同时允许我们在统一框架内分析不同CBDC设计参数对信用配置和利益的影响。 最佳解决方案的均衡分布是，CBDC既不需要质押，也不需要总限制，贷款利差为零。在这种CBDC政策参数的设计下，央行可以消除与投资市场摩擦相匹配造成的福利损失。CBDC供应的限制带来了非效率低投资和低生产的结果。这一结果是由于生产需求的投资产品是由工人以CBDC的形式产生的，而这种投资产品的替代成本很高。因此，CBDC带来的利益增长取决于通过内部货币或外部货币支付的生产投资的可替代性。随着这两种货币形式的相互替代程度的增加，CBDC带来的利益增加和减少。如果这两种货币都是完美的替代品，那么利益增长将趋向于为零。 此外，我们分析了CBDC设计的选择将如何影响银行贷款，并将其解释为证据，证明CBDC具有可能脱离银行部门的媒体。如果内部货币和外部货币的替代程度相对较高，那么对CBDC的更高息差和对CBDC质押更严格的要求将增加银行贷款。如果替代程度较低，银行贷款和CBDC需求将一起下降，尽管下降程度较小，因为后者现在更难被内部货币替代。为CBDC贷款设定一个固定的上限，无疑会增加对银行贷款的需求。一般来说，央行可以通过调整政策参数来控制银行脱媒，但也可能导致输出和福利损失。 我们为未来的研究留下了CBDC对经济周期中货币政策传导或金融稳定的影响。在我们的环境中，价格是可变的，货币是中立的。此外，资产是安全和流动的。因此，我们的模型框架可以解释CBDC对金融体系的结构性变化对稳定状态的影响。 建立和平衡模型的结果。 从这个角度来看，我们呢！ 从这个角度来看，我们呢！ 从长远来看，从长远来看，从长远来看。 下面是文章部分的截图。 从长远来看，从长远来看，从长远来看。 从长到长到长到长到长到长到长到长到长，从长到长到长，从长到长到长，从长到长到长，从长到长，从长到长，从长到长，从长到长。 最后，需要指出的是，现代货币体系特征的展示模式是基于中央银行货币与商业银行货币之间的互动。在无障碍货币体系中，上述两种货币可以自由等价兑换，各具特点。它们在角色扮演方面相互补充，有助于经济的顺利运行。事实上，作为最安全的结算资产，中央银行货币是维持货币体系稳定的支持者和担保人。商业银行货币是为经济提供融资的关键工具，也是在数字背景下青睐经济参与者的支付手段。为了确保两者之间的持续共存，由商业银行在中央银行账户中储备的中央银行货币以实体的形式存在，可能需要跟上数字结构下的支付方案；考虑的解决方案之一是创建第三种中央银行货币，即中央银行数字货币。

In order to assess the prospects of retail transactions of central bank digital currencies (CBDC), central banks have begun their own work plans. However, the issuance of CBDC is important for the implementation of monetary policy, the transmission of monetary policy, and financial stability, depending on the specific design features of CBDC, such as compensation, holding limits, or the selection and pricing of assets held by CBDC. The ECB's working paper "Aunified Framework for CBDC Design: Remuneration, Collaira Radest San" examines the macroeconomic impact of central bank digital currencies (CBDC) in a dynamic equilibrium model. The central bank can set lending and collateral currencies for the central bank. Positive interest rates or tighter staking or quantity limits on central bank digital currencies would reduce welfare, but it could rein in financial disintermediation if there is little substitution flexibility between bank deposits and central bank digital currencies. The Institute of Financial Technology of Renmin University of China (WeChat ID: ruc_fintech) compiled the core part of the article. Digital payment models have grown rapidly over the past few years. Cryptocurrency assets and large tech companies’ thinking about private currency issuance have raised concerns about the security and data protection associated with private currencies. The central bank has begun its own work program to assess the prospects for retail transactions of central bank digital currency (CBDC) issuance. However, depending on the specific design characteristics of CBDC, the issuance of CBDC is of great significance to the implementation of monetary policy, monetary policy transmission, and financial stability, such as using CBDC to pay wages, holding CBDC limits, or selecting and pricing assets held by CBDC. To study these issues, this paper constructs a general equilibrium model including search and matching frictions. The model requires entrepreneurs to borrow internal currency (bank deposits) and external currency (CBDC) to pay for two different types of investments used in production. The central bank chooses the interest rate at which it issues loans to entrepreneurs and pays workers on CBDC deposits. It can also limit the size of each loan and design discount rates for future CBDC revenue as loan collateral. This model assumes that the existence of CBDC in equilibrium is reflected through the production function, while allowing us to analyze the impact of different CBDC design parameters on credit allocation and interests within a unified framework. The equilibrium distribution of the best solution is that CBDC requires neither collateral nor total limit, and the loan spread is zero. Under this design of CBDC policy parameters, the central bank can eliminate welfare losses caused by matching investment market frictions. The limitation of CBDC supply has resulted in inefficient low investment and low production. This result is due to the fact that the investment product that produces demand is generated by workers in the form of CBDC, and the replacement cost of this investment product is high. Therefore, the growth of benefits brought by CBDC depends on the fungibility of production investments paid for through internal currency or external currency. With these two forms of currencyAs the degree of mutual substitution increases, the benefits brought by CBDC increase and decrease. If both currencies were perfect substitutes, interest growth would tend to zero. Furthermore, we analyze how CBDC design choices will affect bank lending and interpret this as evidence that CBDC has the potential to disengage the banking sector from media. If the degree of substitution between internal and external currencies is relatively high, then higher interest margins on CBDC and stricter requirements for CBDC collateral will increase bank lending. If the degree of substitution is low, bank lending and CBDC demand will fall together, albeit to a lesser extent, since the latter is now more difficult to substitute for internal currencies. Setting a fixed cap for CBDC lending will undoubtedly increase the demand for bank loans. Generally speaking, central banks can control bank disintermediation by adjusting policy parameters, but this may also lead to output and welfare losses. We leave to future research the impact of CBDC on monetary policy transmission or financial stability during economic cycles. In our environment, prices are variable and currency is neutral. Additionally, the assets are safe and liquid. Therefore, our model framework can explain the impact of CBDC on the steady state of structural changes in the financial system. Build and balance model results. From this perspective, what about us! From this perspective, what about us! In the long run, in the long run, in the long run. Below is a screenshot of the article section. In the long run, in the long run, in the long run. From long to long to long to long to long to long to long to long, long to long to long, long to long to long, long to long to long, long to long, long to long, From long to long, long to long. Finally, it should be pointed out that the display model of the characteristics of the modern monetary system is based on the interaction between central bank currency and commercial bank currency. In a barrier-free currency system, the above two currencies can be freely exchanged at equivalent prices, each with its own characteristics. They complement each other in role-playing and contribute to the smooth running of the economy. In fact, as the safest settlement asset, central bank currency is the supporter and guarantor of maintaining the stability of the monetary system. Commercial bank money is a key tool for financing the economy and a means of payment that favors economic actors in the digital context. In order to ensure continued coexistence between the two, the physical existence of central bank currency reserved by commercial banks in central bank accounts may need to keep pace with payment schemes under a digital structure; one of the solutions considered is to create a third A central bank currency, namely central bank digital currency.